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ESSAY 
 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER:  SYSTEM  
FAILURE OR SYSTEM FIX?  
BOBBY SCOTT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Six years ago, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker 
that the mandatory sentencing guidelines system was unconstitution-
al.1  Since this decision, Congress has given a great deal of attention to 
federal sentencing and the changes that have resulted from Booker and 
its progeny.  Recently, the Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, of which I am the rank-
ing member, held a hearing to examine what has happened during the 
six years after Booker.  Despite what critics of the decision and those wary 
of judicial discretion claim, the Booker decision did not create a problem 
that needs fixing.  Booker was the fix—not the problem.  This is even 
clearer today than it was at the time Booker was decided. 
Yet the discourse in Congress on federal sentencing and Booker has 
not changed and, in some ways, has become more distorted.  After 
more than thirty years of working on criminal justice reform at the state 
and federal level, I have learned that when it comes to crime policy, we 
have a choice—we can reduce crime or we can play politics.  Reducing 
crime requires science and evidence-based strategies that have been 
proven to positively impact crime statistics.  Playing politics, on the oth-
er hand, involves basing crime policy on slogans and sound bites that 
appeal to emotion.  “Three strikes, you’re out,” “life without parole,” 
 
 †
 United States Congressman, Third District of Virginia. 
1
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). 
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“abolish parole,” “mandatory minimum sentencing,” and “truth in sen-
tencing” are examples of such slogans and sound bites.  Nowhere is this 
truer than in the conversation about federal sentencing. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Congress es-
tablished the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which was charged with 
establishing and maintaining a system of sentencing guidelines for the 
federal courts.2  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 
have proven controversial since their inception, with conservatives 
and prosecutors alleging that judges try to coddle criminals by elud-
ing the Guidelines, while defense attorneys and some judges counter 
that the Guidelines have resulted in excessive sentencing for many 
defendants and a restrictive focus on incarceration.  More than two 
decades after the SRA’s enactment, this debate continues. 
The stated goals of the SRA were to provide: (1) guidance to 
judges with a “comprehensive and consistent statement” of law outlin-
ing the purposes of sentencing, the kinds of sentences available to 
serve those purposes, and the factors to be considered in imposing a 
sentence, including but not limited to the Guidelines; (2) “fairness” in 
sentencing, meaning individualized sentencing and a reduction in 
“unwarranted . . . disparity”; (3) “certain[ty]” that the sentence im-
posed would be the sentence served, and certainty about the reasons 
for the sentence; and (4) a full range of sentencing options from 
which to choose the most appropriate sentence in a particular case in 
order to reduce the use of imprisonment.3 
On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washing-
ton.4  In Blakely, the Court struck down the Washington State Sentenc-
ing Guidelines as unconstitutional,5 placing the validity of the federal 
Guidelines in the gravest doubt and casting a shadow of deep uncer-
tainty over many state sentencing systems.  The Court held that the 
imposition of an enhanced sentence based on factors that were pre-
sented at sentencing and found to exist by a preponderance of evi-
dence by the sentencing judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial 
 
2
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006)). 
3
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39, 50-59 (1983). 
4
542 U.S. 296 (2004).  
5
Id. at 305. 
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by jury.6  In reaching its result in Blakely, the Court relied on a rule it 
first announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey: “Other than the fact of a pri-
or conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”7  Prior to Blakely, most assumed 
that Apprendi’s rule applied only where a sentencing finding of fact 
could raise the defendant’s sentence higher than the maximum sen-
tence allowable by statute for the underlying offense of conviction.  In 
Blakely, however, the Court found that “the statutory maximum for Ap-
prendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on 
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” 
and, hence, even a sentence below the statutory maximum can violate 
the Sixth Amendment.8  Thus, the statutory maximum for purposes of 
sentencing in Blakely was the statutorily sanctioned sentencing guideline 
maximum for the offense of conviction; a fact that increases a defend-
ant’s “statutory maximum” must be found by a jury.9 
In the wake of the Blakely decision, some federal judges concluded 
that Blakely rendered the federal sentencing system unconstitutional.10  
Other judges continued to apply the Guidelines system.11  In the after-
math of the confusion and in an effort to save the Guidelines, Con-
gress considered a temporary statutory fix.  The most prominent of 
proposed “fixes” was the “Bowman Fix,” named for its author, Profes-
sor Frank Bowman.  In essence, this fix would have taken the top off 
the guideline ranges, thus making the maximum sentence for convic-
tion the maximum in the statutory penalty provision for the offense.12  
The bottom range would continue to be binding, and any considera-
tion the court took into account in sentencing the defendant beyond 
the minimum would be in the discretion of the court, guided by gen-
eral sentencing considerations and reason.13  However, because of 
doubts that such a measure could withstand a constitutional challenge, 
and given the decision by the Supreme Court to decide post-Blakely ap-
peals on an expedited basis, Congress took no action on the proposals. 
 
6
Id. at 304-05. 
7
Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
8
Id. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
9
Id. 
10
See, e.g., United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D. Mass. 2004). 
11
See, e.g., United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436, 437 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
12
Memorandum from Frank Bowman to U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 7 (June 27, 
2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004 
/07/white_knight_or.html. 
13
Id. at 7-8. 
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On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Booker and United States v. Fanfan.14  The Court rendered its judgment 
in two separate opinions—one from Justice Stevens, and one from Jus-
tice Breyer—answering two basic questions: (1) Other than a prior 
conviction, must any fact necessary to support an enhanced sentence 
be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury? and (2) If yes, 
should judges still be permitted to use the Guidelines on an advisory 
rather than a mandatory basis?15  Both questions were answered in the 
affirmative16 and decided by a five-four vote, with Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsberg being the only justice voting in the majority for each ques-
tion.  In answering the first question, the Court ruled that the Guide-
lines denied criminal defendants their Sixth Amendment protection, 
as they permitted judges to consider evidence and issues that were 
never presented to a jury for consideration and, furthermore, that 
were being judged by a “preponderance of the evidence” standard ra-
ther than the constitutionally required “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard employed by juries.17  In answering the second question, the 
Court excised two provisions from the SRA:18  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) 
(the provision making the Guidelines mandatory in all cases) and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (setting forth a de novo standard for appellate review 
of departures below the Guidelines—the result of the controversial 
Feeney amendment19).  The result was an invalidation of the Guide-
lines’ mandatory status, reducing their application to an “advisory” 
one.  Under the remaining provisions of the statute, however, sentenc-
ing judges must still “consult those Guidelines and take them into ac-
count,” in addition to considering the other statutory goals of sentenc-
ing, as provided in the SRA.20  Thus, in the wake of the decision, 
 
14
The Court decided Booker with a companion case, United States v. Fanfan.  See 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005). 
15
Id. at 226-27. 
16
See id. at 244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the court in part); id. at 245 
(Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the court in part). 
17
Id. at 226-28. 
18
Id. at 259. 
19
In 2003, Congress passed an amendment introduced by U.S. Representative 
Tom Feeney (R-Fla.).  The Feeney Amendment required that every time a federal 
judge reduced a sentence, that judge’s name be reported to Congress, and also pro-
vided that appellate courts review downward departures with skepticism.  Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 670, 675.  Under Booker, that amendment has appar-
ently been “eviscerated,” since as Justice Stevens stated, “there can be no ‘departure’ 
from a mere suggestion.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
20
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
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federal judges are now free to decide for themselves whether defend-
ants deserve sentences longer or shorter than those the Guidelines 
prescribe.  However, these sentencing decisions are subject to reversal 
on appeal should they be deemed unreasonable.21 
Importantly, as part of its decision, the Court indicated that it 
was incumbent on the Sentencing Commission to continue to carry 
out its statutory responsibility enumerated in the SRA.  The Court 
observed, “The Sentencing Commission will continue to collect and 
study appellate court decisionmaking.  It will continue to modify its 
Guidelines in light of what it learns, thereby encouraging what it 
finds to be better sentencing practices.  It will thereby promote uni-
formity in the sentencing process.”22  In other words, the Court 
found that the Sentencing Commission should continue to refine 
the Guidelines and, as a result, the sentencing process in general.  
Thus, the Sentencing Commission continues to play a critical role, 
even in an advisory guidelines world. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker fundamentally 
changed 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the primary statute governing sentencing 
decisions.  After Booker, the sentencing judge must consider the Com-
mission’s Guidelines and policy statements, but it need not follow them.  
Collectively, they are just one of the many sentencing factors to be con-
sidered under § 3553(a), along with the nature and circumstances of 
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds 
of sentences available, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities and provide restitution, and others.23  The only restriction 
§ 3553(a) places on the sentencing court is the “parsimony” provision, 
which requires the court to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary,” to achieve a specific set of sentencing purposes: 
• to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
• to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
• to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
 
21
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007) (noting that “reasonableness” 
review requires the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard). 
22
Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000)). 
23
Id. at 259-60. 
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• to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner.
24
 
Booker was only the beginning of a new, truly advisory federal sen-
tencing scheme.  Since then, the Supreme Court has issued eleven de-
cisions mapping out the advisory guidelines system that Booker created.  
In Rita v. United States,25 Kimbrough v. United States,26 Gall v. United 
States,27 and Cunningham v. California,28 the Supreme Court set forth 
what the Booker remedy means.  Through its subsequent decisions, the 
Supreme Court made clear that § 3553(a) is the controlling sentenc-
ing law and that Booker is the starting point. 
II.  IMPACT OF BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 
In the six years since Booker, none of the dire predictions about 
rogue judges and erratic sentencing in an advisory guidelines world 
has come to pass.  In fact, the system is functioning smoothly and op-
erating much like the pre-Booker system did.  The Sentencing Commis-
sion’s own data reveal that great disparities in sentencing do not exist.  
The myth that defendants are getting off too easy is quickly debunked 
when one considers that judges nearly always follow the Guidelines’ 
recommendation for a prison sentence.29  To be sure, probation sen-
tences are actually declining.  For fraud offenses, 20.1% of defendants 
received probation without confinement in 2003,30 but only 13.8% re-
ceived probation without confinement in the first three quarters of 
 
24
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
25
551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (permitting presumption of reasonableness on review 
of a sentence within the Guidelines). 
26
See 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (upholding district court’s consideration of all § 
3553(a) factors in granting significant downward variance for crack-related offenses).  
27
See 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (mandating same standard of review regardless of 
whether the sentence was within the Guidelines). 
28
See 549 U.S. 270, 274 (2007) (finding violation of Sixth Amendment under 
California’s sentencing guidelines where judge determined facts that led to great-
er than maximum sentence). 
29
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, 3D 
QUARTER RELEASE 1 tbl. 1 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_ 
Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/ 
USSC_2011_3rd_Quarter_Report.pdf (finding that 81% of all sentences are either 
within the Guidelines or a government-initiated departure). 
30
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS tbl.12, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_ 
and_Sourcebooks/2003/table12.pdf. 
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2011.31  For firearms offenses, 4.3% of defendants received probation 
without confinement in 2003,32 and 2.8% in 2011.33  For drug traffick-
ers, 2.2% in 2003;34 2.2% in 2011.35 
This nation’s growing prison and jail population also belies the as-
sertion that sentences are too lenient.  Incarceration levels in the 
United States have more than quadrupled over the past thirty years 
from about 500,000 in 1980 to more than 2.3 million today.36  The 
United States leads the world, by far, in incarceration.37  Other indus-
trialized nations lock people up at an average rate of about 125 per 
100,000.38  The U.S. average lockup rate is 750 per 100,000,39 about 
five to eight times the rate of other industrialized nations.40  Only Rus-
sia comes anywhere near the U.S. rate, with 628 per 100,000.41  When 
you look at the U.S. rate by race, the numbers are even more alarm-
ing—for blacks, the average rate is 2200 per 100,000, with ten states 
locking up blacks at a rate of almost 4000 per 100,000.  Research by 
the Pew Center on the States established that incarceration has dimin-
ishing returns after about 350 per 100,000, and by 500 per 100,000 may 
even become counterproductive!42  So those states incarcerating blacks at 
almost 4000 per 100,000 may actually be increasing the crime rate by 
locking up so many people.  
Moreover, looking solely at the federal system, the Bureau of Pris-
ons is 37% over capacity, resulting in extreme overcrowding, unsafe 
conditions, and reduced capacity to provide treatment and training that 
has been shown to reduce recidivism.43  Yet less than 30% of federal of-
 
31
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 30 tbl.18. 
32
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30, at tbl.12. 
33
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 30 tbl.18. 
34
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30, at tbl.12. 
35
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 30 tbl.18. 
36
See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id= 
35904; see also Incarceration, THE SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
template/page.cfm?id=107 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
37 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 36,. at 5, 35 tbl.A-7. 
38 See.MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
RATES OF INCARCERATION:  AN EXAMINATION OF CAUSES AND TRENDS 2 (2003). 
39 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 36, at 35 tbl.A-7. 
40 MAUER, supra note 38, at 2. 
41 Id. at 35 tbl.A-7. 
42 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31:  THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORREC-
TIONS 18-19 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_ 
detail.aspx?id=49382. 
43
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 15-16, 49-50, 52 (Mar. 17, 2011) (state-
ment of Harley Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
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fenders commit a new offense after release.44  This low rate of recidi-
vism is not due to our severe sentencing practices.  In 2007, the JFA In-
stitute, a nonprofit criminal justice consulting firm, issued a report con-
cluding that “[m]ost scientific evidence suggests that there is little if any 
relationship between fluctuations in crime rates and incarceration 
rates.”45 
Incarceration is therefore a very expensive way to respond to 
crime, especially when it is counterproductive.  Incarcerating 4000 
per 100,000 means a counterproductive incarceration rate of 3500 
per 100,000.  At an average cost of over $28,000 per year,46 that 
would mean that $87.5 million is spent on counterproductive incarcer-
ation per 100,000 residents.  If you assume that 25% of a population 
of 100,000 consists of children, then that would mean that $3500 per 
child every year is spent on unproductive incarceration.  If, instead, 
the money were directed toward one-third of the children most at 
risk of becoming involved in crime, then that would equate to over 
$10,000 per child every year. 
The “problem” that proponents of Booker reform claim exists—
namely that judges, now untethered from the Guidelines, are out of 
control—is not supported by evidence.  Judges are following the 
Guidelines over 80% of the time,47 despite the fact that many judges 
disagree with the Guidelines.48  And the compliance rate is increasing.  
Notably, the rate of nongovernment-sponsored below-range sentences 
dropped to 16.9% in the third quarter of 2011, down from 18.7% in the 
fourth quarter of 2010.49  This rate represents only a modest increase 
when it is compared with the first year after Booker, when many courts 
were still following the Guidelines as if they were mandatory pending 
 
44
Cf. id. at 30-31 (stating that about seven out of ten inmates are unlikely to com-
mit a new offense). 
45
THE JFA INSTITUTE, UNLOCKING AMERICA:  WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERI-
CA’S PRISON POPULATION 8 (2007), available at http://www.countthecosts. 
org/sites/default/files/Unlocking-America.pdf. 
46
The annual cost of imprisonment per inmate in 2010 was $28,284.16.  Newly 
Available:  Costs of Incarceration and Supervision in FY 2010, U.S. COURTS (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-23/Newly_Available_Costs_of_ 
Incarceration_and_Supervision_in_FY_2010.aspx.  As of December 1, 2011, the federal 
prison population was 216,462.  Weekly Population Report, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly_report.jsp (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). 
47
See supra note 29.  
48
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
JUDGES, JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 8 (2010) (showing, for example, that 
about 30% of judges think that the ranges for many drug offenses are too high). 
49
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 12 tbl. 4.  
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further clarification from the Supreme Court.50  In addition, the gov-
ernment-sponsored below-range rate is approximately 27%.51 
The drop in below-range sentences during the first three quarters 
of 2011 corresponds with the reduction in the crack guidelines on 
November 1, 2010, as directed by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.52  A 
16.9% variance rate from sentencing guidelines by judges is hardly 
cause for alarm.  Indeed, it shows that judges are sentencing within 
(or above) the guideline range or following the prosecutor’s recom-
mendation 83.1% of the time.53 
It is also notable that the government does not object to at least 
half of the judicial variances, even though it wins more than 60% of 
the cases it appeals on § 3553(a) factors.54  And when judges choose 
not to follow the Guidelines, the extent of variances and departures is 
less than thirteen months,55 a rate that has been stable since Booker,56 
and smaller than the departure rate before Booker.57  Despite the modest 
increase in below-guideline sentences since Booker, “the size of their im-
pact on sentence lengths has decreased.”58  Furthermore, judges are fol-
lowing the Guidelines’ recommendations for the kind of sentence to 
impose—whether prison, probation, or an intermediate sentence such 
as home detention—even more than they did before Booker. 
 
50 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT  1 tbl. 1 (2006), avail-
able at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Se
ntencing_Updates/index.cfm (reporting a rate of twelve percent in 2006). 
51
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 29, at 1 tbl. 1. 
52
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in scattered sections of 21 and 
28 U.S.C.). 
53
Id. 
54
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
TICS tbls.56A, 58 (2010).  
55 Uncertain Justice:  The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six 
Years after U.S. v. Booker:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland 
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., app. (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (statement of James E. Felman on behalf of the American Bar Association). 
56 Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2006), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2010). 
57 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
TICS tbl.31A (2004). 
58 Jeffrey Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity:  Changes in Federal Sentencing After 
Booker and Gall?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 340 (2011). 
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III.  MISGUIDED CALLS FOR SENTENCING REFORM 
Despite the data revealing that judges are showing great restraint 
in federal sentencing, there continues to exist dissatisfaction among 
some about the post-Booker sentencing system.  Ever since Booker, there 
have been calls for some kind of a “fix.”  These calls for reform pre-
sume something that has never been demonstrated—that there is a 
problem that needs fixing.  Much of the discourse surrounding this 
need for a “fix” surrounds alleged disparities in sentencing and an un-
substantiated notion that criminal defendants are getting off too easy.  
The SRA was concerned only with eliminating unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.  Simply focusing on the rate of disparities obscures this 
truth.  It appears that a desire for blind uniformity at the cost of fair-
ness is driving much of this debate.59 
Numerous individuals, including the chair of the Sentencing 
Commission, Judge Patti Saris, Matt Miner, and Bill Otis—all witnesses 
at a hearing on federal sentencing in October 2011—have called for a 
number of reforms, including going as far as to recommend abolish-
ing the Sentencing Commission altogether.60  The recommendations 
boil down to this: preventing sentencing judges from imposing sen-
tences outside of the guideline range.  They seek to accomplish this by 
requiring that the Guidelines be given “substantial weight,” that judg-
es give greater justification for imposing nonguideline sentences, and 
that appellate courts review nonguideline sentences under a stricter 
standard of review than currently exists.  Proponents of these reforms 
appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court essentially rejected 
 
59
One of the criticisms of the Booker decision is that racial disparities in sentenc-
ing are growing since it was decided.  Last year, the U.S. Sentencing Commission re-
leased a report stating that black males and noncitizens received longer sentences after 
Booker than did white males and citizens, respectively, after controlling for many, but 
far from all, legally relevant differences among the groups.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES:  AN UPDATE OF THE 
BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/2010/20100311_Multivariate_
Regression_Analysis_Report.pdf.  There are numerous problems with this study, in-
cluding contradictory research coming out of Pennsylvania State University.  See Jeffery 
Ulmer, Michael T. Light & John Kramer, The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in 
the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision:  Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence Between 
Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 830 (2011) (“[G]ender and race differences in sentence 
length are slightly, but significantly, smaller post-Booker . . . .”). 
60 See, e.g., Bill Otis,Abolish the Sentencing Commission and Restore the Rule of Law, CRIME & 
CONSEQUENCES (Feb. 11,  2011), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/ 
2011/02/abolish-the-sentencing-commiss.html.  See generally Hearings, supra note 55. 
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these proposals in Gall and Rita as unconstitutional.61  In order to have 
a truly advisory, and thus constitutional, guidelines system, such 
measures cannot be required.  Since district judges are imposing 
Guidelines sentences an overwhelming majority of the time, we must 
question the wisdom of embarking on an enormous overhaul of fed-
eral sentencing to cure a “problem” that has yet to be identified.  The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since Booker and Fanfan has made it 
clear that the Guidelines have limitations.  This is particularly true 
with respect to congressional directives given to the Sentencing 
Commission to increase the Guidelines with no empirical research or 
data that such increases will actually further the goals of sentencing.  
What proponents of strict Guidelines sentences may not realize is that 
sentencing judges are providing feedback to the Commission every 
time they vary from the Guidelines.  Returning to a mandatory or 
near-mandatory guidelines scheme would cut off this feedback system 
and prevent judges from exercising reasonable discretion in cases that 
warrant it.  Again, this occurs in only a small percentage of cases, but 
when it does, it actually helps the Sentencing Commission refine the 
Guidelines. 
One of the limitations of our federal sentencing system is that it is 
code-based:  each section of the criminal code corresponds to a par-
ticular guideline that sets forth the sentencing calculation.  While this 
may be a good starting point, it fails to distinguish between individuals 
who are convicted under the same code section, but whose crime is 
vastly different.  Each violation of the code section is treated the same, 
notwithstanding the circumstances surrounding the offense or the of-
fender.  Ostensibly, the guideline should make those distinctions, but 
it too often fails to do so meaningfully.  This is because when the 
Guidelines were created, only two mitigating factors were included.62  
One particularly egregious example of the code and the Guidelines’ 
failure to distinguish meaningfully between two offenses and offend-
ers is in the context of a sex offense.  If an 18-year-old high school jun-
ior is convicted of having sex with a 14-year-old high school sopho-
more under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), and a 21-year-old is convicted of 
 
61
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (“We now hold that . . . courts of 
appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside 
the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”); Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 355 (2007) (“Even the Government concedes that appellate courts 
may not presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable.”). 
62
See Thomas W. Hillier II & Amy Baron-Evans, Six Years After Booker, the Evolution 
Has Just Begun, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 132, 136 n.15 (2010) (noting the reductions for 
“role in the offense” and “acceptance of responsibility”).  
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having sex with a 12-year-old under the same statute, then the sen-
tence called for in the Guidelines under § 2A3.2 would be the same,63 
assuming both have the same criminal history score.  Shouldn’t the 
sentencing judge be allowed to take into account the age of the of-
fender in fashioning an appropriate sentence in each case?  Prevent-
ing the judge from considering the age of the defendant, as the 
Guidelines advise, would require the judge to treat these two very dif-
ferent cases exactly the same, resulting in unwarranted uniformity and 
possibly an unjust sentence.  This example illustrates the absurdity of 
the notion that individuals convicted of the same code section viola-
tion deserve the same sentence. 
In addition, the Guidelines, and in particular the sentencing ta-
ble, create the illusion of precision.  In other words, judges and par-
ties often place too much emphasis on the calculation in hopes of ar-
riving at a perfect range from which to extract a number of months 
that befit the offender.  Focusing so much on the table creates a false 
certainty and can obscure the fact that we are meting out justice for 
individuals.  The danger of placing undue emphasis on the mathemat-
ical calculation is underscored when one considers that the table itself 
was not based on any empirical research, nor was the failure to in-
clude more mitigating factors in the Guidelines. 
The lack of mitigating factors in the Guidelines, and not rogue 
judges, is actually responsible for the rate of downward departures or 
variances that critics of the system highlight.  Since mitigating factors 
are not part of the guideline analysis—but aggravating factors are—a 
judge has no choice but to depart or vary downward from the guide-
line range, based on the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to 
account for any existing mitigating factors he or she finds to be pre-
sent.  No other mechanism exists to account for these factors.  This is 
a significant structural flaw in the guidelines system that is often lost 
on critics of judicial discretion.  Taking the example of the 18-year-old 
offender above, a judge in that case would have to rely on the § 3553(a) 
factors, namely the history and characteristics of the defendant,64 to 
consider the offender’s age at sentencing, because the Guidelines, until 
recently, prohibited doing so.65  This flexibility is precisely what the SRA 
 
63
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2 (2011) (providing sentencing guid-
ance for convictions of criminal sexual abuse of a minor under the age of sixteen years). 
64
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
65
While recently, § 5H1.1 of the Guidelines was amended to allow for considera-
tion of an offender’s age, it represents only a modest change—in light of the multitude 
of aggravating factors—and is not a part of the specific offense guideline.   
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sought to preserve:  a regime where judges would sentence “outside the 
guidelines” when presented with a circumstance “not adequately con-
sidered in the formulation of the guidelines.”66 
Those interested in a truly robust debate about our federal sen-
tencing system also should not discount the role that a federal prose-
cutor plays in sentencing.  Critics presume that judges are to blame 
for what is in their view an unacceptable rate of sentences lower than 
that called for in the Guidelines.  However, there exist several rea-
sons—wholly independent of judges—for variations among districts in 
rates of nongovernment-sponsored below-range sentences, including: 
variations in composition of the case load; variations in the presence 
of cases, such as immigration cases, that have low guideline ranges 
where defendants may be sentenced to time served; and variations in 
the rate of government-sponsored downward departures, including 
the use of “fast track” departures, substantial assistance departures, 
other variances and departures, and Rule 35 motions after sentence is 
imposed.  In addition, prosecutor-charging decisions, including over-
charging or stacking of charges to ratchet up the Guidelines sentenc-
es, can greatly affect the rate of departures in a given district. 
Despite this reality, there is virtually no discussion in Congress 
about this phenomenon, and legislation aimed at limiting prosecuto-
rial discretion is a nonstarter.  Even efforts to scale back mandatory 
minimum sentences, which have time and again been demonstrated 
to result in racial disparities and irrational sentences, are met with 
fierce opposition.  This session, our energy has been focused on simp-
ly preventing the enactment of another mandatory minimum.67 
Furthermore, the attack on judicial discretion suggests that Con-
gress and the Commission—who know nothing about the offense or 
the circumstances surrounding it—and prosecutors—who play an ad-
versarial role in administering criminal justice—are in a better posi-
tion to determine a fair sentence than the judges who hear all of the 
facts and circumstances from all sides.  This defies common sense. 
The changes made by Booker and its progeny are extremely modest 
and have been beneficial to the process.  The alarm bell that some are 
 
66
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51-52 (1983). 
67
Last year’s passage of the Fair Sentencing Act, which eliminated the mandatory 
minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine, marked the first time in forty years 
that Congress repealed a mandatory minimum.  See KARA GOTSCH, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, BREAKTHROUGH IN U.S. DRUG SENTENCING REFORM:  THE FAIR SENTENCING 
ACT AND THE UNFINISHED REFORM AGENDA 6 (2011), available at http:// 
sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_WOLA_Article.pdf. 
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sounding is a false alarm.  Not only are changes to the current system 
unnecessary, but the consequences of moving to a more mandatory 
sentencing scheme can also be very detrimental.  To appreciate the 
dangers of “the politics of sentencing,” one need only look to the un-
fair and racially discriminatory 100:1 sentencing disparity between 
powder cocaine and crack cocaine, which was enacted by Congress 
and took twenty years to remedy.68  Indeed, there are some who think 
Booker did not go far enough.  Yet the myopic focus on the alleged 
problems created by the Booker decision leave no room for a conversa-
tion about the true problems that persist with federal sentencing, such 
as mandatory minimums and a lack of evidence-based sentencing 
practices.  This conversation is long overdue, but so long as we insist 
on deconstructing Booker year after year and blaming federal judges 
for their imagined sentencing activism, we will never get there. 
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Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2006), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) 
amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1A 2010); see also GOTSCH, supra note 67, 
at 6 (explaining that Congress set the new ratio at 18:1). 
